Family Law Archives - Page 18 of 36 - Lonich Patton Ehrlich Policastri

Educational Degrees and Divorce

May 24, 2017/in Family Law /by Michael Lonich

More individuals today have received some sort of professional degree or training than ever before. But with the influx of costs for higher education many married students rely on their spouse for financial support. And upon legal separation or divorce a spouse who supported the other through their education may be entitled to reimbursement for their community fund contributions.

If a spouse chooses to obtain a professional degree or training during their marriage usually two events occur. First, the non-student spouse supports the other financially by paying for the community and educational expenses. Second, after the education is complete, community funds may be used to repay any outstanding loan amount. Upon legal separation or divorce in California these educational loans will be assigned to the spouse who received the education or training and the non-student spouse may have a right to reimbursement for their community contributions. However, California does not recognize an obtained degree or training as community property and therefore its value cannot be divisible upon divorce.

The reimbursement for community fund contributions to a spouse’s education or training is an exclusive remedy governed by Family Code Section 2641. But the spouse seeking reimbursement has a burden to trace the funds to a community property source such as earnings acquired during the marriage. Reimbursement is seen to give a fair “quid pro quo” (this for that) of the community’s investment in the education of a spouse. A supporting spouse may receive reimbursement if the education or training “substantially enhanced” the earning capacity of the spouse or the marriage has ended before the community obtains a benefit from such education. Contributions that may be reimbursed involve payments made with community or quasi-community property to support the student spouse’s education expenditures. These expenses include: tuition, fees, books, supplies, transportation, and directly related educational expenses. However, a spouse will not receive reimbursement for ordinary living expenses since these would have been incurred regardless of a spouse’s educational expedition.

Full reimbursement is not guaranteed though and a court may choose to impose limitations on a spouse’s reimbursement amount if their case’s circumstances warrant such a decision. There are several reasons for a limitation and the ones listed below are by no means exhaustive, but merely illustrative.

A person embarks on an advanced degree or training for a multitude of reasons, one of which may be for better financial standing. Yet, even though there is an expectation that the education will benefit the marital community there is no presumption that the enhancement will be “substantial.” Thus, if a spouse cannot demonstrate the education received in fact substantially enhanced the earning capacity, then reimbursement may be limited.

“Unjust reimbursement” can also limit reimbursement. This occurs when a court determines specific circumstances within a case renders a full reimbursement of the community contributions unfair. For example, if both spouses have obtained a degree or training at the community’s expense a reimbursement to only one would be unjust since both were at one point supported by the other. Unjust reimbursement may also occur when a spouse receives education or training that substantially reduces their need for spousal support. These examples however are merely illustrative and many other circumstances may lead a court to deem full reimbursement to a spouse as unjust.

Finally, a written agreement between the spouses that waives or modifies a reimbursement right may limit a spouse’s amount receivable. Such a waiver or modification must be written expressly; it cannot be agreed upon orally or implied and must be signed by the adverse party.

The achievement of obtaining a degree or training is rewarding for all involved. However, upon legal separation or divorce, rights to reimbursement for community contributions can become complex. If you are considering a divorce or legal separation and would like more information about divorce and educational reimbursement, please contact the experienced family law attorneys at Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri.

Lastly, please remember that each individual situation is unique, and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may detail general legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Hardship Factors in Child Support Cases

April 24, 2017/1 Comment/in Family Law /by Michael Lonich

May a parent claim a child from a different relationship as a hardship on their income when figuring in the guideline amount of support? The short answers is yes, you can claim a minor child from a different relationship as a hardship deduction if you meet the requirements.

Hardship deductions from income for supporting other children only apply to a child who is either a natural or adopted child of the party involved in the child support case. For example, if you were married and had two children from the marriage, then get divorced and later have another child form a second marriage, the child from the second marriage could potentially considered as a hardship on your income when calculating support for the two children from your marriage.

However, it is important to note that stepchildren cannot be considered as a hardship deduction, only natural or adopted children. The reason is that it only applies to children where there is a legal obligation to provide support. Also, the hardship child needs to reside with the parent. A child from another relationship that doesn’t reside with the parent involved in the child support case would not qualify, although child support paid for other children can be considered separately from hardships in calculating guideline child support.

Another important element to understand is that the maximum hardship deduction for a hardship child cannot exceed the amount of support allocated to each child covered by the child support order. This puts a limitation on how much hardship can be claimed, with the intent to protect the children who already are due support by the parent.

California Family Code sections 4070-4073 regulate the hardship claims that can be made in a child support case. Something to keep in mind is that the hardship deduction for another child may not affect the amount of support as much as the parent thinks it will. For a person paying support, a hardship child deduction will lower the support, but since there usually is also a benefit from the extra tax deduction that another child provides, it often does not lower it as much as people expect.

Many courts, such as the Santa Clara County Superior Court, use a computer program when calculating support called Dissomaster. A Dissomaster report is often attached to any child support order, and shows the breakdown of each parent’s income, and automatically calculates the guideline support. If using this software, the hardship child would usually be given either a factor of .5 or 1.0 in the hardship deduction section, depending on if the hardship child is fully or partially supported by the parent. When the factor is entered, the program will automatically calculate the amount of the hardship deduction, and apply it to the child support guideline calculation.

Because getting a hardship child to be figured into the child support amount can be complicated, it may be necessary for a parent to obtain the assistance of a family law attorney to ensure that the parent gets the proper deduction credited to them.

If you are considering a divorce or legal separation and would like more information about hardship factors, please contact the experienced family law attorneys at Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri. We can help you understand and manage any support issues that may arise.

Lastly, please remember that each individual situation is unique, and results discussed in this posit are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may detail general legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

The More The Merrier Revisited: Tri-Custody in New York

March 31, 2017/in Family Law /by Michael Lonich

As we have discussed on this blog before, California allows a child to have more than two legal parents. With the rise of assisted reproduction and wider recognition of non-traditional family units, it is growing apparent that children may receive substantial physical and emotional care from more than two people.

In California, the Martinez v. Vaziri case concluded that a child’s biological mother, biological father, and third person—the man who cared for the child and was the child’s only father figure—could all claim legal parentage. The case’s holding was grounded in a California statute (Family Code Section 7611) that allows children to have more than two legal parents if recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child.

Now, New York has stepped up to the plate in a case involving a polyamorous family. After a lengthy custody battle, a judge awarded custody of a child to three different people. When the child was born, the three people had been involved in a longstanding intimate relationship. Two of the people were married, and the remaining person lived next door. The married woman (Wife) could not conceive, so the family decided that the married man (Husband/Father) would impregnate the third woman (Mother), and the family would raise the child together. Ultimately, Mother gave birth to a boy, but then, Wife and Husband/Father got divorced while Wife and Mother continued their relationship. Even though Wife continued to see her son during his custodial time with his biological mother, Wife wished to formalize her own legal link to the boy.

Concluding that the child viewed both women as his mothers and would be devastated if any of his three parents were removed from his life, a New York judge granted parental rights to Wife, Husband/Father, and Mother. Unlike in California, this decision is not grounded in a statutory right to have more than two parents, but the case evidences an emergent shift in the judiciary’s interpretation of what constitutes a family unit.

If you have any questions about establishing your child’s legal parentage, please contact the experienced family law attorneys at Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri—we can help you understand and secure your and your child’s legal rights.

Lastly, please remember that each individual situation is unique, and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may detail general legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

SOURCE:

http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/14/health/three-parent-custody-agreement-trnd/

Understanding the Impact of the Spousal Fiduciary Duty on Estate Planning

March 21, 2017/in Estate Planning, Family Law /by Michael Lonich

We have outlined the spousal fiduciary duty on this blog before; now, we’re delving a bit deeper to discuss the impact of the spousal fiduciary duty on estate planning. Traditionally, California courts rely on a common law burden-shifting framework when confronted with the possibility that a spouse has unduly influenced his/her spouse’s estate planning decisions. However, a 2014 case from a California Court of Appeal—Lintz v. Lintz— took a different approach, and instead, relied on the statutory spousal fiduciary duty articulated in California Family Code section 721 to resolve an estate planning/undue influence claim.

The common law framework provides that the person alleging undue influence bears the burden of proof. However, the challenger can shift the burden to the proponent of a testamentary instrument by establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, three elements: 1) a confidential relationship, 2) active procurement of the instrument, and 3) an undue benefit to the alleged influencer.

Departing from the common law, the Lintz court—faced with an allegedly abusive wife who intimidated her husband into amending his trust to her tremendous benefit and to the extreme detriment of her stepchildren—looked to Family Code section 721 when it decided in favor of the husband’s estate. Section 721 creates a broad fiduciary duty between spouses that demands a duty of “the highest good faith and fair dealing.” Further, neither spouse may take unfair advantage of the other. As a result, if any inter-spousal transaction advantages only one spouse, a statutory presumption arises under section 721 that the advantaged spouse exercised undue influence. The presumption is rebuttable—the advantaged spouse can demonstrate that the disadvantaged spouse’s action was freely and voluntarily made, with full knowledge of the facts, and with a complete understanding of the transaction.

California Family Code section 850 describes three categories of inter-spousal transactions: 1) community property to separate property, 2) separate property to community property, and 3) separate property of one spouse to separate property of other spouse. Notably, the section does not consider transferring community or separate property to trusts.

The court concluded that section 721 applies because section 850 does include property transferred to revocable trusts—in Lintz, Wife’s undue influence caused Husband, via his trust, to transmute a large part of his separate property to community property. Accordingly, the court held that Family Code section 721 creates a presumption of undue influence when one spouse names the other as a beneficiary in a revocable trust.

Criticism of the decision abounds—all estate plans that name a spouse as a beneficiary, by their very nature, benefit one spouse. In turn, use of the Family Code undue influence presumption threatens to disturb all testamentary instruments, and litigation may flood the family courts as spouses seek to rebut the seemingly automatic presumption that Lintz creates. On the other hand, some commenters believe Lintz does not indicate a new paradigm, but rather, showcases a court’s eagerness to remedy the serious injury inflicted by a spouse’s egregious influence.

At the very least, the Lintz case does demonstrate that estate planning and family law are deeply intertwined. Consulting with an attorney to learn how a marriage or divorce can impact your testamentary wishes is always wise. If you have any questions about your family law and/or estate planning needs, please contact the experienced attorneys at Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri—we offer free half-hour consultations.

Lastly, please remember that each individual situation is unique, and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may detail general legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

SOURCES:

California Family Code section 721

California Family Code section 850

Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346.

The “Brangelina” Custody Battle

November 14, 2016/in Family Law /by Lonich Patton Ehrlich Policastri

After more than a decade together and six kids, Angelina Jolie and Brad Pitt are getting divorced. Aside from the challenges presented by the division of their purportedly very high value estate, the parties also face a potentially very challenging custody battle over their six children, who are all under the age of 16 years old.

To determine child custody, California courts look to “the best interests of the child.” While it sounds simple, this standard can prove quite challenging for the court depending on the family. Variables such as the child’s age, maturity, and their relationship with the parents, need to be considered. Moreover, the child’s school and activity schedule and the parents’ work schedules only add to the challenge. Courts may also, but are not required to, consider the child’s preference if he or she is of appropriate age and capacity. Whether a child is of “appropriate age and capacity” depends largely on their maturity and understanding of the proceedings, usually found to be around age 10.

Each case is different based on the level of cooperation, or animosity between the parents. Ideally, the parents can work together and agree on a workable custody schedule. However, the far more common scenario involves parents who cannot agree, and have difficulty communicating with one another. For these parents, the court must step in and make determinations based on the facts presented.

First, the court will send the parents to mediation. The mediator is a third-party neutral, meant to facilitate the parents’ coming to an agreement. Next, if they are still unable to agree, the judge will meet with the parents at a Judicial Custody Conference. If the parents are still unable to agree, the judge will order the parents to go through an Assessment After the Assessment, an in-depth process where the judge ultimately decides the custody and visitation schedule.

Courts may award sole or joint physical custody to the parents. Sole physical custody consists of the child living with and being supervised by one parent. Joint physical custody, on the other hand, can take many forms depending on the parents’ schedules, proximity to one another, etc. When parents share joint physical custody each parent has “significant periods” of physical custody. This does not necessarily equate to equal time between parents.

In Brangelina’s case, their unique work-life schedules, and global lifestyles will likely play a large role in how custody is ultimately split between the parties. Media sources report that both parties have asserted a desire to have physical custody of the children. Thus, some form of joint physical custody is the most likely result. Given that both, Angelina and Brad are actors, they have similar interests in a less traditional time-split for the children. Both parties will have to concede that they have extended periods of time when they remain on-site, and work long days while filming, which make them less available for the children during those time periods. A traditional 50-50 split is not going to work for them. Thus, it behooves them to try to cooperate with one another and recognize where they share common ground – the desire to give their kids the very best life they can. Luckily, Angelina and Brad have robust means to provide as non-traditional of a lifestyle for their children as they need to in order to fit whatever time-split needs they may have.

If the two cannot agree on an amicable custody arrangement, the court may have to step in. Given the children’s ages, it may consider their preferences depending on whether it finds they are of appropriate age and capacity. The court will likely strongly urge Angelina and Brad to try to agree on their own in light of the inherent publicity that follows their fame and the public’s interest in their celebrity lives. Like all parents, the parties are likely to feel more satisfied with an agreement they formulated rather than a court’s determination.

If you need help with a custody or visitation claim, please contact our California Certified Family Law Specialists. Our attorneys have decades of experience handling complex family law matters and offer a free consultation.

Please remember that each individual situation is unique and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may include legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Grandparents Have Rights Too: Grandparent Visitation

November 11, 2016/in Family Law /by Mitchell Ehrlich

The relationship between a grandparent and a grandchild can be one of great happiness and importance for both the grandparent and grandchild. However, sometimes events such as divorce or a parent’s death may strain loving relationships between grandparents and their grandchildren. As a result, the grandchild’s parent(s) may block any further contact with grandparents. However, all 50 states now have some type of grandparent visitation law that allow grandparents to ask the court to give them the legal right to maintain their relationships with their grandchildren.

In California, a statute grants visitation rights to grandparents only when they have a preexisting relationship with their grandchild “that has engendered a bond such that visitation is in the best interest of the child.” Cal. Fam. Code § 3104. In addition, the statute directs the court to balance the interest of the child in visitation with his or her grandparent against the right of the parents to exercise their parental authority. Id. Finally, the statute provides a rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is not in the best interest of the child if the parent objects.

However, in a recent case, Stuard v. Stuard, the Third District found that even though Family Code section 3104 provides a rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is not in the best interest of the child if the parent objects, the parent’s right is not absolute. Stuard v. Stuard (2016) 244 Cal. App. 4th 768. According to the Stuard court, the law “reflects a legitimate state interest in preserving an already existing grandparent-grandchild relationship that is threatened but in the best interest of the grandchild to safeguard.” In other words, even though there may be rebuttable presumption, it may be overcome. The grandparents will need to show in some detail what it is that they add to the grandchildren’s lives, not just a general statement that they have a close relationship with the children and that continuing that relationship is in the best interest of the child.

In a time when families are constantly changing, grandparent visitation laws have become increasingly significant. If you have any questions about grandparent visitation and would like to speak to an attorney, please contact Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri for further information. Keep in mind that each individual situation is unique and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may include legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Smith/Ostler Order: Accounting for Bonus Income’s Impact on Support Payments

October 19, 2016/2 Comments/in Family Law /by Virginia Lively

When calculating spousal or child support, courts look to a wage earner’s monthly income to determine an appropriate support amount. However, what if the wage earner spouse or parent receives bonus income in the years after the initial support order is entered? Support orders can be altered, but the process involves a court room, lawyers, and more legal fees. In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith offers an alternative answer—the Smith/Ostler order.

A Smith/Ostler order takes into account a spouse or parent’s unearned or prospective income, detailing when and how any future, additional earnings should be incorporated into a support order. However, because bonus income is prospective only, it may never be realized. Calculating support based off an unknown and/or unguaranteed dollar amount can underestimate or inflate a support order. Therefore, to account for the speculative nature of bonus payments, courts deal in percentages.

For example, in the seminal In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith case, the court awarded Wife 15 percent of Husband’s future cash bonuses. If Husband received a bonus, he would give 15 percent of whatever amount he earned to Wife, but if Husband did not receive any cash bonuses, he would not pay additional support. Importantly, the original support order would remain intact, and the parties would not need to argue over how much of the bonus income the supported spouse should be paid—the court order took care of those details and created a more easily administered support order.

In addition to cash bonuses, a Smith/Ostler order can account for future stock option income. For example, in In re Marriage of Kerr, Wife and Husband, while married, improved their standard of living by exercising stock options that had increased in value. Subsequently, during divorce proceedings, the court award Wife, through a Smith/Ostler order, a percentage of Husband’s income from any future exercise of those same stock options.

However, In re Marriage of Kerr presented an exceptional case where an additional measure besides a percentage amount was necessary to ensure that Husband’s spousal support order was not inflated. The value of Husband’s stock had increased exponentially after he divorced Wife. A specified percentage of the stock’s value would have increased Husband’s payments to a point that far exceeded the marital standard of living he shared with Wife. Thus, the court concluded that under special circumstances, such as the case at hand, use of a Smith/Ostler order is permissible only if the court caps the amount of future income a spouse can receive at a number proportionate to the martial standard of living.

If you are considering a divorce or legal separation and would like more information about how either action may affect your finances, please contact the experienced family law attorneys at Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri. We can help you understand and manage any spousal or child support issues that may arise.

Lastly, please remember that each individual situation is unique, and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may detail general legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Sources:

In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 33

In re Marriage of Kerr (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 87

Mediation: Taking control of your divorce

October 10, 2016/in Family Law /by David Patton

The underuse of the mediation process seems to be largely attributable to the fact that many people are unaware of what a mediation session is and how beneficial it can actually be. In family disputes, mediation can be extremely rewarding, saving parties time, money and sanity.

The rules of mediation: you create them

In mediation, parties are not bound by many of the rules that govern judges’ decision making. As a result, parties can reach solutions that might not otherwise be available from a court. For example, if there is a dispute over child support or child custody, rather than having a judge decide the amount of support or amount of visitation based on guidelines and factors required by statute, parties are free to negotiate an amount or time deemed reasonable to both.

The outcomes: you decide them

In mediation, you are free to discuss with your spouse what is important to both of you and try to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. It differs from litigation in that parties avoid the uncertainty, time and stress associated with going to trial. Parties are able to hear and understand the other’s point of view and with the guidance of a mediator, this enables parties to reach a middle ground . Because the mediator does not have the authority to make decisions, it is ultimately the parties making their OWN decisions over their OWN lives.

However, a good mediator should have some family law experience and be able to offer practical guidance to the parties. A mediator with family law experience can offer parties insight as to what might and might not be granted in court, ensuring that no request is unreasonable or disadvantageous to the other spouse. This can make the mediation session much more productive.

Progress: in the mediation room and beyond

Lastly, even if you don’t settle all your divorce issues, chances are you did resolve some. Even having resolved one issue is progress. Further, the tenants of mediation promote cooperation and communication. Thus because parties are provided the opportunity to resolve their own case, mediation tends to reduce hostility and preserve ongoing relationships.

While divorce mediation works in many situations, it is not always appropriate. Litigation is often the best option in situations where there is domestic violence, one party refuses to cooperate in making required disclosures, or communication between the parties is impossible. If you have any questions about divorce mediation and would like to speak to an attorney, please contact Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri for further information. Keep in mind that each individual situation is unique and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may include legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Understanding the Spousal Fiduciary Duty

September 9, 2016/in Family Law /by Gretchen Boger

Marriage prompts a lot of change—last names, bank accounts, estate plans, housing—but one of the most important changes that arrives once you say “I do” is a fiduciary duty to your new spouse. Fiduciary duty may sound like a term reserved for the boardroom, but a broad fiduciary relationship exists between married spouses as well.

At the most basic level and as prescribed by California Family Code § 721, spouses possess a duty of “the highest good faith and fair dealing,” and “neither spouse shall take any unfair advantage of the other.” Further, the spousal fiduciary duty includes “the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners” as outlined in the California Corporations Code. Although the Corporations Code uses business-centric language, the Family Code incorporates partner-based duties and applies them to spouses. Thus, spousal fiduciary duties include: 1) allowing access to transaction books, 2) providing full and true information about any community property, and 3) an accounting of any benefit derived from any community property transaction by one spouse without consent of the other spouse. Additionally, spouses owe each other a duty of loyalty—spouses must refrain from dealing with each other as an adverse interest and must refrain from competing with each other—and a duty of care.

Returning to the Family Code, Section 1100 details the fiduciary duties that accompany the control and management of community property. Of note is subsection (b): “a spouse may not make a gift of community personal property for less than fair and reasonable valuable, without the written consent of the other spouse.” In other words, even when giving a community fund-purchased gift to his/her children, a spouse needs the written consent of the non-purchasing spouse. Typically, a nonconsenting spouse is unlikely to challenge holiday and birthday gifts given to his/her own children, but that spouse does have the legal ability to void the gift and receive compensation for its value—an issue usually raised during a separation or divorce proceeding.

Importantly, even after spouses separate or file for divorce, they still owe a fiduciary duty to one another—until all assets and liabilities have been officially divided, spouses must act with respect to each other and fully disclose all material facts and information regarding community property or debts.

Ultimately, most spouses don’t actually keep (or legally, even have to keep) detailed transaction books in the manner expected of business partners, nor do most spouses actually ask for formal consent before making routine purchases, but it is important to note that unilateral transactions could be used as ammunition in a separation or divorce proceeding. Therefore, if you are pondering a large purchase or gift, it is wise to document the process, seek the written consent of your spouse, and/or use your own separate property to make the purchase.

If you would like more information about the fiduciary duty you owe to your spouse, please contact the experienced family law attorneys at Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri. From pre-nuptial agreements to divorce proceedings, we can help you understand how the spousal fiduciary duty plays a role in your marriage.

Lastly, please remember that each individual situation is unique, and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may detail general legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Sources:

California Family Code § 721

California Family Code § 1100

How SB 1255 (the “anti-Davis legislation”) Will Impact Your “Date of Separation”

August 29, 2016/3 Comments/in Family Law /by Mitchell Ehrlich

Currently divorcing spouses or couples considering divorce better consult a lawyer soon—a newly enacted statute has changed the method by which California courts determine a married couple’s “date of separation.” On July 25, 2016, the governor of California, Jerry Brown, signed SB 1255 (aka the “anti-Davis legislation”), a bill which amends California Family Code § 771 and adds section 70 to the Family Code. As a result, the existing standard that governs a married couple’s “date of separation” has been changed. Previously, Family Code § 771 instructed that spouses were not separated until they were “living separate and apart”—a phrase which courts interpreted to mean “living in separate residences.” With the passing of SB 1255 though, spouses may now be considered “separated” even if they share a common residence.

A couple’s legal “date of separation” is important because it determines the point at which a spouse’s earnings and accumulations are no longer considered “community property” and instead, are considered a spouse’s own “separate property.” In turn, the difference between community and separate property is important because absent a written agreement stating otherwise, all community property must be evenly divided between divorcing spouses.

SB 1255’s nickname—the “anti-Davis legislation”—came about because of the case its creation abrogates: In re Marriage of Davis. In July 2015, the Davis court held that “living in separate residences ‘is an indispensable threshold requirement’ for a finding that spouses are ‘living separate and apart,’” or in other words, for determining a “date of separation.” However, the Davis court didn’t create new law—it merely affirmed what it believed was the California legislature’s intention when it coined the phrase “living separate and apart” many years ago.

To ascertain the legislature’s intent, the Davis court had to do go back 146 years to 1870 when the phrase was first used in a statute that protected the rights of married women. Similarly to section 771, the 1870 Act did not define “living separate and apart.” However, according to the Davis court, section four of the 1870 Act suggests that the legislature intended for the phrase to require separate residences: a wife, who was “living separate and apart” from her husband and wished to sell her real property without joining her husband, had to record a declaration that included a description of “her own place of residence” and a statement that “she is a married woman, living separate and apart from her husband.”

Additionally, when the California legislature repealed a number of Family Code sections in 1969, it created a new statute (section 5118) that reproduced the 1870 Act language. Once again though, the legislature provided no specific definition of “living separate and apart.” The Davis court reasoned that the legislature’s continued use of the phrase—without defining it—expressed its satisfaction with earlier judicial interpretation of the language.

Further, the Davis court also relied on a notable 2002 case—In re Marriage of Norviel—which concluded that “living apart physically is an indispensable threshold requirement to separation, whether or not it is sufficient, by itself, to establish separation.” Therefore, relying on legislative history and case law, the Davis court affirmed the Norviel holding—spouses had to live in separate residences before they could be considered separated.

While the Norviel and Davis courts may have correctly discerned the original meaning of “living separate and apart,” our modern legislature took issue with their holdings and in response, passed SB 1255. The bill expressly abrogates Norviel and Davis, and rather than provide a specific definition for “living separate and apart,” the legislature did away with the phrase all together. Instead, section 771 (the modern statute that contained the disputed language) now uses the phrase “after the date of separation” to determine when a spouse’s accumulations and earnings transition from “community” to “separate” property. In turn, newly added section 70 defines “date of separation” as a “complete and final break” that is evidenced by two factors: 1) a spouse has expressed his or her intent to end the marriage to the other spouse, and 2) the conduct of the spouse is consistent with his or her intent to end the marriage. Further, section 70 requires that a court look at all “relevant evidence” when making the above determination.

This statutory change was spurred on by Senator John Moorlach (R-Costa Mesa), the author of SB 1255. He believed it was necessary to change the Family Code language because many spouses wish to separate legally in order to protect their personal finances, but also, wish to continue sharing a residence in order to save costs during their divorce. Thus, SB 1255 should better reflect the reality of modern divorce experiences.

While the amended Family Code sections do provide clarity and allow couples more post-separation flexibility, it is important to note that SB 1255 may not be the end of legal disputes about separation dates—in the coming years, case law will further refine section 70. Additionally, couples in the process of a divorce should not let SB 1255 pass by them unnoticed because when the new law goes into effect on January 1, 2017, it may retroactively apply to any cases pending on that date, but this issue still needs to be resolved and addressed by the Family Courts in California. Look for another blog post on this topic specifically. However, consulting now with your attorney to develop a “date of separation” strategy is in your best interest.

If you are considering a legal separation or divorce, please contact the experienced family law attorneys at Lonich Patton Erlich Policastri—we can help you navigate the effects of SB 1255 and answer any questions you may have about how the new law will impact your divorce. The sooner you understand how SB 1255 will affect your current or impending legal plans, the better you can prepare for the new rule when it goes into to effect on January 1, 2017.

Lastly, please remember that each individual situation is unique, and results discussed in this post are not a guarantee of future results. While this post may detail general legal issues, it is not legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.

Sources:

2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 114 (S.B. 1255)

In re Marriage of Davis (2015) 61 Cal.4th 846

In re Marriage of Norviel (2002) 102.Cal.App.4th 1152

Educational Degrees and Divorce

Hardship Factors in Child Support Cases

The More The Merrier Revisited: Tri-Custody in New York

Understanding the Impact of the Spousal Fiduciary Duty on Estate Planning

The “Brangelina” Custody Battle

Grandparents Have Rights Too: Grandparent Visitation

Smith/Ostler Order: Accounting for Bonus Income’s Impact on Support Payments

Mediation: Taking control of your divorce

Understanding the Spousal Fiduciary Duty

How SB 1255 (the “anti-Davis legislation”) Will Impact Your “Date of Separation”

Free 30-Minute Family Law or Estate Planning Consultation

Contact Us